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The unprecedented surge of preferential trade liberalization since World War II spurred theoretical and empirical work on the matter alike. Theoretical 
research illustrated under which conditions preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 
induce welfare gains for participants.1 Econometric work confirmed that economic 
and political fundamentals determine preferential trade liberalization through PTA 
membership very much along the lines hypothesized by economic theory (see Scott 
L. Baier and Jeffrey H. Bergstrand 2002, 2004, 2009; Christopher S. Magee 2003; 
Hartmut Egger, Peter Egger, and David Greenaway 2008): PTAs are most likely 
concluded among large, similarly-sized, non-distant economies which have modern 
political systems. In part this empirical work has even strived for an identification of 
causal effects of PTA membership and found that, indeed, PTA membership causes 
bilateral trade.
1 The existing body of theoretical work on endogenous trade policy in general and endogenous PTA membership 
in specific is by far too large to be discussed here. However, we refer the interested reader to the excellent surveys 
by Dani Rodrik (1995), Richard E. Baldwin and Anthony J. Venables (1995), and Baldwin (2009), for details.
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The Trade Effects of Endogenous Preferential 
Trade Agreements†
By Peter Egger, Mario Larch, Kevin E. Staub, and Rainer Winkelmann*
Structural new trade theory models have never been used to evaluate 
and quantify the role of preferential trade agreement (PTA) member-
ship for trade in a way which is consistent with general equilibrium. 
Apart from filling this gap, the present paper aims at delivering an 
empirical model which takes into account both that PTA member-
ship is endogenous and that the world matrix of bilateral trade flows 
contains numerous zero entries. These features are treated in an 
encompassing way by means of (possibly two-part) Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood estimation with endogenous binary indicator 
variables in the empirical model. (JEL F11, F13, F15)
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However, from a theoretical perspective, there are two major discomforts with 
seemingly all empirical work on the causal effects of PTA membership on trade flows. 
First, general equilibrium effects are ignored. All of the corresponding work relies 
on the so-called stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) which requires 
that PTA membership only affects PTA insiders but outsiders not at all (see Jeffrey 
M. Wooldridge 2002; Colin A. Cameron and Pravin K. Trivedi 2005). Obviously, 
this is at odds with general equilibrium. James J. Heckman, Lance Lochner, and 
Christopher Taber (1998) emphasize and illustrate that treatment effects can be 
severely biased when ignoring general equilibrium effects. They criticize that the 
“paradigm in the econometric literature on treatment effects is that…there are no 
spillovers…” and argue that “standard policy-evaluation practices are likely to be 
misleading…” accordingly (p. 381). Second, the extensive margin of bilateral trade 
is forgotten about and sample selection is induced by focusing on log-transformed 
trade flows as outcome. This paper ventures for an alternative approach which pays 
explicit attention to both of these problems.
We pursue an empirical modeling strategy which is informed by three influential 
strands of recent empirical research in international economics: first, the work on 
empirical estimation of general equilibrium models where trade costs exert bilateral 
as well as multilateral effects on trade and GDP (see Jonathan Eaton and Samuel 
Kortum 2002; James A. Anderson and Eric van Wincoop 2003; Anderson 2009); 
second, research on zeros in bilateral trade matrices for any year or averages of years 
suggesting that the extensive margin of bilateral trade should be modeled explic-
itly in empirical analysis (see J. M. C. Santos Silva and Silvana Tenreyro 2006; 
2008; and Elhanan Helpman, Marc Melitz, and Yona Rubinstein 2008); third, the 
literature on endogenous PTAs and their causal effects on trade flows (see Baier 
and Bergstrand 2002; 2007; 2009).2 Interestingly, these obviously important three 
 bodies of work are virtually unconnected.
This paper treats PTA membership as an endogenous determinant of bilateral trade 
while allowing for (numerous) zero bilateral trade flows in the empirical model, and 
respecting both the bilateral and multilateral effects of endogenous PTAs on trade in 
the quantification of PTA effects. In contrast to preceding work by Eaton and Akiko 
Tamura (1994); Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2008); and Helpman, Melitz and 
Rubinstein (2008), we allow (binary) determinants of exports to be endogenous. 
In particular, we suggest empirical models based on pseudo-maximum likelihood 
estimation with endogenous (binary) explanatory variables.
We apply these models to a cross-sectional dataset of bilateral trade flows and 
their determinants—among them a binary PTA membership indicator—for the year 
2005. We compute cum-PTA bilateral trade flows and compare them to counterfac-
tually predicted trade flows in a sine-PTA general equilibrium. Eliminating PTAs 
2 The quantification of the effects of preferential trade agreement (PTA) membership has been a major source of 
interest of empirical bilateral trade flow modelers for decades. See Jan Tinbergen (1962), Herbert Glejser (1968), 
Norman D. Aitken (1973), for some of the earliest examples and Caroline Freund (2000), Isidro Soloaga and L. 
Alan Winters (2001), and Céline Carrère (2006) for more recent ones. Greenaway and Chris Milner (2002) provide 
a useful survey. For decades, the dominant paradigm in related work was that countries were randomly assigned 
to PTAs. Only recently, Baier and Bergstrand (2002, 2004, 2007, 2009), Magee (2003), and Egger, Egger, and 
Greenaway (2008) allowed for PTAs to be endogenous to trade in an econometric sense.
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reduces trade flows among members directly, but it also entails indirect effects on 
third countries through the impact of PTAs on producer prices, consumer prices, 
and GDP.
Our findings may be summarized as follows. The results shed light on three 
potentially large biases associated with the ignorance of the three mentioned issues: 
general equilibrium (third-country) effects of PTA membership; zeros in trade matri-
ces; and the endogeneity of PTAs. The biases are of different magnitude, though. 
Let us use the PTA-related change of bilateral exports among members relative to 
nonmembers to quantify biases. Then, for instance, a log-linear model of exports 
which ignores general equilibrium effects on top of the other problems leads to 
a bias of −186 percentage points or −79 percent relative to the preferable two-
part approach (which inter alia controls for the presence of heterogeneous firms). A 
one-part Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood model which disregards non-random 
selection into positive exports and treats PTA membership as exogenous leads to a 
bias of the impact of PTAs on members’ relative to nonmembers’ trade by −176 
percentage points or −75 percent relative to a two-part model which copes with 
all of the mentioned problems. A one-part model which acknowledges endogenous 
PTA membership but disregards the problem of an excessive number of zeros in the 
data leads to a downward bias of the PTA effect by about −73 percentage points or 
−31 percent.
Apart from these biases there are another two which seem relatively less impor-
tant. Disregarding the presence of heterogeneous firms appears less relevant than the 
mentioned biases. A two-part model without heterogeneous firm controls leads to a 
bias of the average estimated PTA effect of −15 percentage points or −6 percent in 
general equilibrium. In comparison, it is even less harmful to ignore that PTA mem-
bership effects are heterogeneous due to the variation in most-favored nation tariff 
rates. Ignoring heterogeneous tariffs in the preferable two-part PTA model leads to a 
downward bias of the PTA-induced effect of less than one-tenth of a percentage point.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly intro-
duces the bilateral trade flow model we will rely upon. Section II points out three 
problems with the implementation of that model in applied work targeted towards the 
analysis of PTA membership effects on trade. Section III describes the specification 
and data. Section IV introduces the modeling strategy to overcome these obstacles 
by treating zero trade flows implicitly, and presents the corresponding estimation 
results. Section V derives a zero-inflated gravity equation, lays out econometric two-
part models, and summarizes the estimation results thereof. Section VI computes 
the impact of PTA membership as observed in the year 2005 and compares it to 
an unobserved counterfactual situation without any PTA memberships in the same 
year. The last section concludes with a summary of the most important findings.
I. Specifying Bilateral Trade Flows in the Vein of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derive a general representation of bilateral 
aggregate nominal trade flows in new trade theory models with one sector and n 
countries. For instance, such models include the ones of Anderson (1979) or Paul R. 
Krugman (1980) with love-of-variety preferences à la Avinash K. Dixit and Joseph 
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E. Stiglitz (1977). Their framework can be briefly introduced as follows. Let us 
denote nominal exports of country i to country j (with i, j = 1, … , n ) by  X ij and 
refer to trade costs associated with exports from country i to j as  t ij . Finally, use  y i ,  y j , 
and  y W for country i’s, country j’s, and world GDP (total expenditures), respectively. 
Then, nominal bilateral exports are determined as
(1)  X ij =   y i  y j  _ y W    t ij 1−σ  Π i σ−1 p j σ−1 ,
where σ is the elasticity of substitution among products (variants) and  Π i ,  p j are 
 so-called multilateral resistance (MR) terms for exporters and importers, respec-
tively. MR terms reflect multilateral (non-linearly weighted) trade costs firms 
of an exporting country and consumers in an importing country are faced with. 
Empirically, these MR terms are not observed but they can be readily derived as 
implicit solutions of the following set of 2n equations3
(2)  Π i 1−σ =  ∑ 
j=1
n
   ( t ij 1−σ  p j σ−1  y j / y W ) ;  p j 1−σ =  ∑ 
i=1
n
   ( t ij 1−σ  Π i σ−1  y i / y W ) ∀ i, j. 
The structural representation of the model brings about a substantial advantage over 
other, reduced-form (and partly ad-hoc) specifications of gravity models of bilateral 
trade. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998, p. 381) mention that “standard policy-
evaluation practices are likely to be misleading” if individual (in our case, country-
pair specific) choices affect others’ economic outcome, as is the case in general 
equilibrium models like the one we are considering. “the paradigm in the econo-
metric literature on treatment effects is that (…) there are no spillovers (…).” Since 
spillover effects from one country-pair to others are at the very heart of the matter, 
a full account of the impact of trade costs or PTA membership on exports in general 
equilibrium needs to respect their effect on all variables on the right-hand side of 
(1): on trade costs as such ( t ij ), on exporter GDP ( y i ), importer GDP ( y j ), and world 
GDP ( y W ), respectively (since they are a function of trade flows), and on the exporter 
and importer MR terms ( Π i and  p j ), respectively. Notice that the direct effects of 
trade costs are generally dampened by the MR terms as illustrated in Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003).
Since direct measures of trade frictions  t ij are typically not available, one uses proxy 
variables thereof. The bilateral log-distance between countries’ capitals (Dis t ij ), 
a common international border indicator (Bor D ij ), and a common official language 
indicator (lAn g ij ) are typical examples. In most empirical models of bilateral trade 
flows, trade policy is accounted for as an element of  t ij by including an indica-
tor variable of preferential trade agreement membership (pt A ij ). The commonly 
adopted assumption about the relationship between  t ij and these proxy variables is
(3)  t ij 1−σ = exp( β 1 Dis t ij +  β 2 Bor D ij +  β 3 lAn g ij + ⋯ + δpt A ij ).
3 Notice that the 2n equations have to be properly normalized to avoid multiple solutions to the system of 2n 
equations (see Anderson 2009).
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Substituting (3) into (1), we obtain the multiplicative model
(4)  X ij = exp( Z ij ′ β + δ PT A ij +  α i +  γ j ),
where  Z ij = (1, diS T ij , Bor d ij , …)′ is a vector containing a constant and all trade 
cost or trade facilitating variables except PT A ij . Moreover, β = ( β 0 ,  β 1 ,  β 2 , …)′ 
is a vector of coefficients corresponding to the elements in  Z ij .  α i = ln( y i  Π i σ−1 ) 
and  γ j = ln( y j  P j σ−1 ). In this model, the coefficient on the constant is defined as 
 β 0 = − ln  y W .
II. Empirical Problems with the Implementation of a Structural Gravity Model
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) suggest estimating a stochastic version of (4)
(5)  X ij = exp( Z ij ′ β + δ PT A ij +  α i +  γ j ) ϵ ij ,
by taking the logs of both the left-hand-side and the right-hand-side and essentially 
minimizing the sum of squared residuals subject to (2). Alternatively, the param-
eters β and δ can be estimated directly by treating  α i and  γ j as fixed country effects. 
Given these parameters, the 2n multilateral resistance terms in (2) may be computed 
subsequently. Since general equilibrium effects are fully captured by the country 
fixed effects, estimation of β and δ does not hinge upon the general equilibrium 
structure of the model. In fact, it is well-known that the econometric specification 
(5) can represent a wide range of (one-sector) models including the multi-country 
version of the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model, Eaton and Kortum (2002), or Robert 
C. Feenstra (2004). Hence, most of what we will talk about with regard to estima-
tion below applies to a wide range of empirical models that are informed by general 
equilibrium theory. The choice of the underlying theoretical model determines the 
magnitude and transmission channels of comparative static effects but not parameter 
estimates.
With parameter estimation, two issues may arise in such an empirical context. 
First and most importantly, recent work in international trade emphasizes that PTA 
membership should be treated as an endogenous rather than an exogenous determi-
nant of trade (see Baier and Bergstrand 2002, 2007, 2009; Magee 2003). Baier and 
Bergstrand (2004) derived theoretical hypotheses about the determinants of PTA 
membership which work well in empirical applications. Yet, while previous work 
put great effort into identifying the causal effects of (endogenous) PTA member-
ship, the empirical paradigm has been using microeconometric methods for program 
evaluation which prevent structural estimation of the impact of PTA membership as 
suggested by equations (1) and (2).4 This research thus assumed that PTA mem-
bership of one country-pair only affects this pair’s bilateral exports but not those 
of other country-pairs. The latter feature is at odds with both intuition and general 
equilibrium. We will show how the model in 1 can be adapted to account for some 
4 Previous work predominantly relied on Heckman-type switching regression models (Baier and Bergstrand 
2002; Magee 2003) or matching methods based on the propensity score (Baier and Bergstrand 2002, 2009).
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 endogenous trade frictions, still obeying (2). Obviously, such a goal can only be 
achieved by means of instrumental variable estimation.
Second, depending on the dataset in use, the n(n − 1)-size vector X of bilat-
eral exports with typical element  X ij may contain numerous zeros (see Helpman, 
Melitz, and Rubinstein 2008) whose omission (by taking the log of the left-hand-
side of the model) would in general lead to an efficiency loss and to inconsistent 
parameter estimates. Some authors have circumvented the problem of omitting zero 
trade flows by adding a small positive constant to X, a transformation that enables 
logarithmizing all  X ij . Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that this approach 
leads to inconsistent parameter estimates as well. The severity of the bias result-
ing from this ad-hoc solution can be quite large. Thus, estimating the model in its 
original multiplicative form (5) seems highly preferable. Furthermore, multiplica-
tive  models as in (5) imply by construction that higher conditional expectations go 
hand in hand with higher conditional variances. This pattern of heteroskedasticity is 
a well-known stylized fact of trade data, rendering multiplicative estimation of the 
model even more attractive.
We elaborate on these issues in Section IV, where we present an econometric 
model of the gravity equation which is able to appropriately deal with both of these 
problems. Before that, we describe our general specification and the data used.
III. Specification and Data
We broadly follow Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and Egger, Egger, and Greenaway 
(2008) to model selection into PTA membership as a function of three sets of char-
acteristics: variables capturing political affinities or impediments to bilateral trade 
liberalization, proxies for iceberg trade costs, and country size and relative factor 
endowments. We classify two countries as belonging to a common PTA, if they 
were active since 2005 or earlier as notified to the World Trade Organization. The 
data were augmented and corrected by using information from PTA secretariat web-
pages and they were compiled to obtain a binary dummy variable reflecting PTA 
memberships for the year 2005. The three sets of exogenous variables contain the 
following elements:
Variables capturing Political Affinities or impediments to Bilateral Trade 
Liberalization.—Political scientists have pointed to a number of political fac-
tors which are hypothesized to affect bilateral trade flows (see Egger, Egger, and 
Greenaway 2008, for a brief survey). The corresponding variables reflect character-
istics of political systems. The associated variables are based on the data collected in 
the Polity IV Project (see Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers 2007). In particular, 
we include the absolute difference in a score variable, measuring the autocracy of an 
exporter and an importer, respectively (AuTo c ij );5 the absolute difference in a vari-
able, measuring the durability of an exporter’s and an importer’s political regime, 
5 AuTo c ij measures Institutionalized Autocracy in a country. In the most extreme form, autocracy suppresses 
competitive political participation, chief executives are chosen within a small political elite, and once in office exer-
cise power almost without institutional constraints. The source data vary between 0 and 98.
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 respectively (durA B ij );6 the absolute difference in a score variable, measuring the 
political competition in the government of an exporter and an importer, respectively 
(PoLcom P ij ).7 
Proxies for iceberg Trade costs.—Log bilateral (great circle) distance between 
two countries’ capitals (diS T ij );8 an indicator variable which is one in case of a 
common land border between countries i and j and zero else (Bor d ij ); an indica-
tor variable which is set to one if two countries have a common language and zero 
else (LAn g ij ); an indicator variable which is set to one if two countries are located 
at the same continent and zero else (con T ij ); an indicator variable which is set 
to one if one of two countries had been a colony of the other in the past and zero 
else (coLon y ij ); an indicator variable which is set to one if one of two countries 
had been a colony of the other after the year 1945 and zero else (curco L ij ); an 
indicator variable which is set to one if the two countries had a common colonizer 
in the past and zero else (comco L ij ); an indicator variable which is set to one if 
one country was part of the other in the past and zero else (SmcTr y ij ). All of the 
mentioned trade cost indicators are taken from the geographical database provided 
by the Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). The 
list of variables in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) did not include (country dummies 
and) LAn g ij , coLon y ij , curco L ij , comco L ij , or SmcTr y ij .
country Size and relative factor Endowments.—Exporter and importer country 
size in terms of their log GDP as two separate determinants as well as all other 
country-specific determinants such as population, capital-labor ratio, etc., are fully 
accounted for by fixed exporter and importer dummy variables. Baier and Bergstrand 
(2004) use non-linear transformations of exporter and importer log GDP and include 
log total bilateral GDP and log similarity of bilateral GDP as determinants of PTA. 
In addition, they include two measures of relative factor endowment differences. 
One of them reflects the capital-labor relative factor endowment difference between 
two countries in a pair and the other one captures the capital-labor relative factor 
endowment difference between that pair and the rest of the world. We recreated 
these four variables, although for reasons of data availability (the dataset used here 
contains 15,750 country-pairs while the one in Baier and Bergstrand 2004, covered 
only 1,453 country-pairs) we had to use real GDP per capita instead of employing 
capital-labor ratios.9 However, capital-labor ratios are highly correlated with real 
GDP per capita. While these variables worked well for the determination of PTA 
membership, we ran into convergence problems when using these jointly for the 
PTA and exports equations. We conducted robustness checks using two of them at a 
time (not reported) to make sure that our reported results where not changed by their 
6 durA B ij measures the number of years since the most recent regime change or the end of a transition period 
without any stable political institutions in place. durA B ij is computed for all years beginning with the first regime 
change since 1800 or the date of independence if that event occurred after 1800.
7 PoLcom P ij measures to which degree party participation is regulated in a country and to which degree there 
is competition in participation. The source data vary between 0 and 98.
8 Baier and Bergstrand (2004) include a variable which is defined as nATurA L ij = − diS T ij . Hence the 
expected sign of diS T ij is exactly the opposite of the one of nATurA L ij .
9 Data on real GDP and population are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
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inclusion or omission. In the specification used in the following sections, we omitted 
these variables, as the detected patterns for parameter estimates were not affected by 
their inclusion or omission in any substantial way.
Finally, our empirical model includes the following trade cost variables in 
Z ij in the nominal exports outcome equation (5): diS T ij , Bor d ij , and LAn g ij , 
con T ij , durA B ij , AuTo c ij , PoLcom P ij , Curco L ij . Otherwise, nominal exports 
are a function of a complete set of exporter and importer dummy variables,10 and of 
(potentially endogenous) PT A ij . Data on bilateral exports in nominal US dollars are 
collected from the United Nation’s World Trade Database.
Table 1 summarizes mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the 
distribution of the dependent and independent variables employed in the estimated 
models. Here, we would like to emphasize that about 37 percent of the cells of the 
10 Which capture GDP and MR terms in (5).
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics of the Data
Variable Description Mean SD Min. Max.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 X ij Nominal exports in million US dollars 305.9274 3,257.2670 0 213,763.06
  ij Indicator variable taking value one if  
X ij > 0 
0.6280 0.4834 0 1
PT A ij Indicator variable taking value one 
if two countries belong to a common 
PTA since 2005 or earlier
0.2226 0.4160 0 1
diS T ij Log distance 8.2002 0.8267 3.2467 9.4191
Bor d ij Common border indicator variable 0.0210 0.1432 0 1
LAn g ij Common language/ethnicity indicator 
variable
0.1393 0.3463 0 1
coLon y ij Colony indicator variable 0.0152 0.1225 0 1
comco L ij Common colonizer indicator variable 0.0777 0.2677 0 1
curco L ij Colony after 1945 indicator variable 0.0084 0.0912 0 1
SmcTr y ij Same country indicator variable 0.0088 0.0935 0 1
con T ij Same continent indicator variable 0.2303 0.4211 0 1
rgdPsu m ij Log of sum of real GDPs 25.2322 1.8080 19.9296 30.1824
rgdPsi m ij Similarity of real GDPs −2.1131 1.4877 −9.7690 −0.6931
dK L ij Difference between log of capital-
labor relative factor endowments 
between pair ij 
1.8217 1.2944 0.0001 6.1001
droWK L ij Difference between log of capital-la-
bor relative factor endowment between 
pair ij and rest of the world
1.4852 0.6493 0.0659 3.7327
durA B ij Durability of an exporter’s and an 
importer’s political regime
29.4047 29.2178 0 100
PoLcom P ij Political competition index 8.8961 19.9440 0 98
AuTo c ij Autocracy index 7.9867 18.9474 0 98
Observations 15,750
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bilateral exports matrix are zero and about 22 percent of the 15,750 country-pairs in 
our dataset are members of a common PTA.
IV. Estimating a Gravity Model with Zero Export Flows and 
Endogenous PTA Membership
For an assessment of the effects of PTA membership on trade flows, it is neces-
sary to obtain consistent estimates of the unknown parameter vector β and the PTA 
parameter of interest, δ. However, δ does only reflect direct effects of PTA member-
ship on exports. To quantify total effects—which also account for feedback across 
countries consistent with general equilibrium—we need to compute counterfactual 
exports without PTA membership. The latter also account for the impact of PTA 
membership on GDPs and MR terms as explained in Section I. We will quantify 
the impact of PTA memberships by comparing predicted exports of PTA insiders 
with PTAs as of 2005 relative to outsiders with predicted relative trade flows in 
a counterfactual scenario without any PTAs. While the corresponding simulation 
results are presented in Section VI, our first objective in the subsequent sections is 
to consistently estimate β and δ.
A. Econometric model
Since the parameters of interest in model (5) are β and δ, terms  α i and γj can be 
considered, from an econometric point of view, as nuisance parameters. The model 
to be estimated thus represents a two-way country-specific effects model, where  α i 
and γj subsume the effects of GDP and MR terms, but may depend on other coun-
try-specific factors as well. The appropriate econometric methods depend on the 
assumptions on the relationship between ( α i , γj) and the regressors,  Z ij and PT A ij . 
If ( α i , γj) were independent of  Z ij and PT A ij , random effects estimation would be 
consistent and efficient. However, the underlying economic model suggests that  α i 
and γj depend on  Z ij and PT A ij . Therefore, the model should be treated as a two-way 
fixed effects model.
There are two important differences to a standard panel data model, though. First, 
this model is non-linear, and simple (within) transformations to eliminate the fixed 
effects are not available. Second, since the data consist of all possible pairs of n 
countries, and each country is observed as both exporter and importer, there are 
n(n − 1) observations. Hence, adding one country to an existing set of n econo-
mies gives 2n additional observations but only 2 additional parameters. It follows 
that there is no incidental parameter problem, and the country fixed effects can 
be estimated consistently (for n → ∞) by including a dummy variable for each 
importer and exporter country.11 This procedure is computationally intensive, given 
11 The classical incidental parameter problem in non-linear panel models says the following. Suppose that data 
vary in two dimensions, one of which is small (with a fixed number of T units) and one is large (with n → ∞ 
units). Then, it is impossible to estimate individual fixed effects for each unit in n consistently. Similarly, the slope 
parameters of covariates can then not be estimated consistently.
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the large number of 2n − 2 fixed effects to be estimated, but it is straightforward in 
its application.
The conditional expectation function (CEF) of model (5) is
(6) E( X ij |  Z ij , PT A ij ,  α i , γj) = exp( Z ij ′ β + δPT A ij +  α i + γj)E( ϵ ij |  Z ij , PT A ij ,  α i , γj).
Under the assumption of exogenous PTA membership, E( ϵ ij |  Z ij , PT A ij ,  α i , γj) = 1 
and model (5) would be simply an exponential CEF model. However, acknowledg-
ing that PTA membership is potentially endogenous, we want to allow for possible 
correlation between the error term  ϵ ij and the propensity to form an agreement. To 
tackle this problem we implement an instrumental variable method based on the 
joint distribution of  ϵ ij and PT A ij . Specifically, assume the following reduced-form 
equation for PT A ij ,
(7)  PT A ij =  { 1 if  W ij ′ θ ≥  v ij ,  0 if  W ij ′  θ <  v ij , 
where  W ij is a vector comprised of variables affecting a country i’s participation 
decision in a preferential trade agreement with country j. The elements of  W ij have 
been listed in Section III and they contain all elements of  Z ij as well as instrumen-
tal variables excluded from (6). Endogeneity arises if the errors  v ij and  ϵ ij are not 
statistically independent. Following Joseph V. Terza (1998), it is possible to derive 
a tractable form of E( X ij |  Z ij , PT A ij ,  W ij ,  α i , γj) under the assumption of bivariate 
normality of  v ij and ln( ϵ ij ), which leads to the following expressions
(8) E( X ij |  Z ij , PT A ij ,  W ij ,  α i , γj) =  λ ij  Ψ ij ,
with
(9)  λ ij ≡  exp( Z ij ′ β + δPT A ij +  α i + γj) and
  Ψ ij ≡ E( ϵ ij |  Z ij , PT A ij ,  W ij ,  α i , γj)
 =  PT A ij  Φ(ϑ +  W ij ′ θ)  _Φ( W ij ′ θ)  + (1 − PT A ij )  
1 − Φ(ϑ +  W ij ′ θ)  __ 
1 − Φ( W ij ′ θ)  .
The last equality follows from joint normality of the errors, where Φ(⋅) denotes 
the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.12 The 
12 Note that the assumption of normality leads to a Probit model for PT A ij as is common in the empirical lit-
erature. As for ln( ϵ ij ), which is an additive element to the linear index  Z ij ′ β + δPT A ij +  α i + γj, it can be thought 
of as unobserved heterogeneity stemming from omitted variables. Assuming normality here does not seem wholly 
unreasonable, since a case can be made for normality even if some omitted variables are not normally distributed, 
as their sum would tend to be so by some version of the central limit theorem if only the omitted variables were 
sufficiently numerous and independent.
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 parameter ϑ is equal to the square root of the variance of ln( ϵ ij ), multiplied by ρ, the 
correlation coefficient between  v ij and ln( ϵ ij ). If ρ = 0, the errors are independent, 
and  Ψ ij = 1 so that the conditional expectation of  X ij in (8) simplifies to  λ ij , which is 
exactly the special case considered in (6) with E( ϵ ij |  Z ij , PT A ij ,  α i , γj) = 1. However, 
if ρ ≠ 0, estimation of the parameters β contained in  λ ij will be inconsistent if  Ψ ij 
is neglected.13
The recent literature has suggested non-linear least squares (NLS) as well as vari-
ous pseudo-maximum likelihood (PML) estimators as the preferred approaches to 
estimate multiplicative gravity models such as (6) with E( ϵ ij |  Z ij , PT A ij ,  α i , γj) = 1 (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006).14 These estimators differ in their weighting func-
tions, and thus in efficiency. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2008) show that if the 
conditional variance of the exports is proportional to the conditional mean, then the 
first-order conditions from minimizing the squared errors of the model are numeri-
cally equivalent to the first-order conditions of the Poisson PML model. Also, they 
find that the Poisson PML estimator performs well compared to other PML and NLS 
estimators in a series of different Monte Carlo simulation setups.15
Likewise, the parameters of model (8) can be estimated by non-linear least 
squares, by minimizing the sum of squares of ( X ij −  λ ij  Ψ ij ) as in Terza (1998), or 
by Poisson PML estimation where the conditional expectation is now  λ ij  Ψ ij . As 
before, the NLS estimator gives more weight to observations with larger trade flows, 
while the Poisson PML estimator gives equal weight to all observations. While both 
techniques yield consistent estimates of the parameters if the conditional mean 
(8) is correctly specified, the results reported in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) 
strongly encourage us towards viewing Poisson PML estimates as more efficient. 
The Poisson PML estimator for the model with endogenous PTA is implemented 
as a two-step estimator. In a first step, consistent estimates of θ are obtained from 
a Probit regression of model (7). In a second step, we replace θ by   θ in (8) and use 
Poisson PML to estimate the remaining parameters β, δ and ϑ. Second-step standard 
errors have been adjusted to account for the variance of first-step estimates.
B. Estimation results
Using the data described in Section III, we estimated the parameters of the 
structural models of Section IVA by Poisson PML. Table 2 displays estimates of 
three alternative models of nominal bilateral exports in US dollars ( X ij ). Column 2 
 summarizes estimates from a naïve log-linear model which simply drops all data 
points for which bilateral exports are zero and treats PTA membership as exogenous. 
13 An alternative estimation technique which does not rely on bivariate normality is the GMM approach of F. A. 
G. Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997). However, no comparable extension of this GMM approach for the two-part 
model has been proposed. Our parametric assumptions allow us to extend the estimator to the two-part model of 
Section VB.
14 Under PML the information matrix equality does not hold and robust standard errors are computed using the 
“sandwich” estimator involving the inverse of the Hessian matrix and the outer product of the gradient.
15 Alternative consistent estimators include other members of the linearized exponential family such as the nor-
mal PML model or the gamma PML model. The negative binomial model is not a linear exponential family unless 
the dispersion parameter is set to an arbitrary constant. We do not report such other estimates since, with our data 
and specifications, their numerical properties were poor and convergence was hard to achieve, the likely reason 
being the presence of numerous fixed effects to which the Poisson PML estimator appears to be less sensitive to.
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Obviously, the corresponding estimates in column 2 differ quite starkly from the ones 
in columns 3 and 5 and so do their comparative static effects so that we will  dismiss 
this estimator and not refer to it further in the subsequent discussion. Column 3 
reports parameters and robust standard errors of a Poisson PML model that treats 
PT A ij as exogenous. In column 5, PT A ij is allowed to be endogenous. For this, we 
used a first-stage probit model based on the covariates mentioned in Section III and 
summarized in column 4 of Table 2. In principle, the model for endogenous PTAs 
Table 2—Estimation Results for Gravity Models for Trade
Exogenous PTA Endogenous PTA
Regression E(ln( X ij )) E( X ij | ⋅) Pr(PT A ij = 1 | ⋅) E( X ij | ⋅)
Estimator OLS Poisson PML Probit ML Poisson PML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PTA 0.3943 0.5548 — 1.1471
(0.0499) (0.1256) (0.3838)
diST −1.2342 −0.4998 −1.0737 −0.3971
(0.0417) (0.0492) (0.0403) (0.0675)
Bord 0.7264 0.7263 −0.4687 0.7405
(0.1115) (0.0726) (0.1292) (0.0748)
LAng 0.6490 0.1553 −0.1193 0.2079
(0.0555) (0.0813) (0.0626) (0.0698)
conT −0.0143 0.2736 0.7650 0.1506
(0.0549) (0.1222) (0.0479) (0.1579)
durAB −0.0026 −0.0038 −0.0072 −0.0041
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009)
PoLcomP 0.0106 0.0737 −0.0483 0.1044
(0.0010) (0.0327) (0.0091) (0.0271)
AuToc −0.3784 −0.1039 0.0480 −0.1391
(0.0122) (0.0325) (0.0098) (0.0291)
curcoL 1.3321 0.7246 0.5189 0.6179
(0.1402) (0.1695) (0.2468) (0.1833)
coLony — — 0.1356 —
(0.1941)
comcoL — — 0.5519 —
(0.0719)
SmcTry — — 1.2275 —
(0.2496)
  ϑ — — — −0.3708
(0.1810)
f-stat. — — 88.7790 2.4949
p-value of f — — 0.0000 0.4762
f-stat. OIR — — — 1.4530
p-value of OIR — — — 0.4836
Observations 9,891 15,750 15,750 15,750
Countries 126 126 126 126
notes: The sources of the data are the United Nations’ World Trade Database and the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives 
et d’Informations Internationales. All regressions include importer and exporter fixed effects. The last two col-
umns indicate results where PTA was instrumented.   ϑ is a measure for potential endogeneity of PT A ij . “f-stat.” and 
“p-value of f ” refer to a test of joint significance of COLONY, COMCOL and SMCTRY in the respective equa-
tion. The f-statistic should be significantly different from zero in column 4 but not in column 5. “f-stat. OIR” and 
“p-value of OIR” refer to a test for over-identifying restrictions in the corresponding log-linear IV model.
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does not need instruments to be identified if the distributional assumptions are met. 
As we did not wish to rely on functional form alone, we excluded a subset of the first-
stage variables  W ij from the set of second stage variables  Z ij to act as instruments.
The instruments should have an effect on the probability to form a PTA, but they 
should not have other, direct effects on exports. The first assumption can be tested by 
performing an f-test on the joint relevance of the instruments in the reduced-form 
equation in column 4. We test the second assumption in two ways. On the one hand, 
we include them as additional regressors in the outcome equation and test for their 
relevance on outcome beyond their role for PTA. We do so by performing f-tests on 
the joint relevance of the instruments in the model in column 5. Moreover, we test 
whether the instruments pass a conventional test for overidentifying restrictions in 
a log-linearized version of the model for positive exports. The variables coLony, 
comcoL, and SmcTry are significant determinants of PTA as can be seen from 
the low p-value of the reported f statistic in column 4, and they pass the tests for 
instrument validity according to the insignificant f-tests on overidentifying restric-
tions in column 5. Hence, countries are more likely to select into PTA membership 
given a shared colonial past, but—after controlling for other determinants of trade 
flows—these determinants do not directly affect trade.16
The results in Table 2 suggest the following conclusions. First of all, selection 
into PTAs based on observables is positive for some variables such as conT and 
curcoL: these factors raise the probability of joining a PTA and also tend to have 
a trade-increasing effect, implying that particularly those country-pairs which dis-
play a high level of goods trade flows select into PTAs anyway. Notice that this 
result is consistent with the hypothesis in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) according 
to which PTAs exhibit the highest welfare gains in countries where bilateral trade 
flows would be (and are) large. However, there are also variables which negatively 
affect both selection into PTAs as well as bilateral exports: examples are diST and 
durAB. Finally, there are observables which have the opposite impact on selection 
into PTAs and on exports: for instance, Bord, LAng, and PoLcomP, affect selec-
tion into PTAs negatively but exports positively; on the contrary, AuToc affects 
selection into PTAs positively but exports negatively.
Second, there is evidence for selection into PTAs on unobservables. Endogeneity 
of PT A ij can be assessed by a simple t-test on   ϑ, an estimate of the (scaled) correla-
tion between PT A ij and the stochastic error in the exports. If PT A ij is exogenous, the 
correlation must be zero, so that the null hypothesis ϑ = 0 provides a valid test for 
exogeneity. We find that   ϑ is negative and significant, thus rejecting exogeneity of 
PT A ij . A negative ϑ indicates that unobservables (i.e., bilateral factors other than the 
economic and politic determinants which we include in our models) favoring the 
creation of a PTA on average come along with unobservables that have a negative 
impact on bilateral trade. This negative self-selection based on unobservables leads 
to a downward bias in the estimated PTA parameter: the point estimate increases 
as we abandon the assumption of exogeneity. The remaining parameters are fairly 
stable across columns 3 and 5.
16 In contrast to this, more recent colonial ties (curcoL, which measures colonizing after 1945) do have a 
significant impact on trade beyond influencing PTA membership.
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The results from the probit estimation for the reduced-form equation of PTA are 
broadly in line with comparable previous work. The political variables durAB, 
PoLcomP, and AuToc turn out to be important for the decision to join a PTA as 
in Egger, Egger, and Greenaway (2008).17 These variables were not included in the 
models of Magee (2003) or Baier and Bergstrand (2004), nor were the colonial his-
tory variables. However, the finding of statistically significant effects of a positive 
influence if countries are on the same continent (conT ) is consistent with Baier 
and Bergstrand (2004), and the negative effect of distance is in line with both Baier 
and Bergstrand’s (2004) cross-sectional analysis and Magee’s (2003) cross-section 
and panel results.
V. Modeling Zero Trade Flows Explicitly
In our dataset, 37.2 percent of all entries in the bilateral trade matrix were zeroes. 
The previous approach accommodated those zero trade flows implicitly. We did 
not need to exclude non-trading country-pairs, nor did we artificially change the 
source data (e.g., by adding a positive constant to all export flows as in Gabriel 
J.Felbermayr and Wilhelm Kohler 2006) to allow for log-linearization. Yet the high 
incidence of zero trade makes it potentially interesting to split the overall effect 
of PTA membership on expected trade volumes into its two component parts, an 
effect at the extensive country margin of exports—i.e., the number of pairings which 
started exporting because of PTA membership—and the effect at the the intensive 
country margin—the extent to which PTA membership raised exports among pairs 
that traded already.
The focus on country margins is different from the recent emphasis on firm mar-
gins introduced by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). In their model, trade 
volumes (our intensive country margin) can change due to new (and less productive) 
firms entering into export markets, or due to existing firms expanding their activi-
ties. For our analysis, this distinction is unimportant, as both effects are part of the 
causal pathway from PTA membership to increased country trade volumes, and we 
are interested in this overall effect.
To motivate our econometric specification of a two-part gravity model, we 
therefore consider a model of symmetric monopolistically competitive firms, as in 
Krugman (1980), thereby neglecting firm heterogeneity. In that model the extent of 
fixed bilateral market entry costs relative to operating profits in a market governs a 
firm’s decision to serve the target market via exports or not.
17 They are also important determinants of trade flows. In general, discrepancies on the levels of political com-
petition, autocracy and durability reduce the probability of forming a PTA and the volume of trade. However, this 
fails for the difference in autocracy, which has a positive effect on PTA, and the difference in political competition 
which appears to increase exports.
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A. Theoretical model
Let us denote export-market specific fixed costs for firm b in country i to deliver 
goods to market j by fj (b). Each firm b supplies a single variety of the product and 
faces market-specific profits  π j (b) in country j = 1, … , n of
(10)  π j (b) = [   pj (b) −   zj (b)]  c j (b) − fj (b).
In equation (10),   pj (b) denotes the consumer price of variant b and   zj (b) are the 
associated marginal costs of supplying variant b to consumers in j (including mar-
ginal production costs and trade costs). Unlike Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein 
(2008), let us assume for the model outset that all producers in country i are sym-
metric with respect to   zj (b) and fj (b).18 As a consequence, we may drop product 
index b throughout our analysis and index products by their country of origin. Then, 
we may substitute  π j (b) =  π ij ,   pj(b) =   pij,   zj (b) =   zij ,  c j (b) =  c ij , and fj (b) = fij for 
all variants delivered by i-borne producers to consumers in j.
Firms in i will now maximize profits across all markets by setting identical mill 
prices  p i for consumers everywhere. With iceberg-type trade costs  t ij for exports 
from i to j, the relationship between consumer prices and mill prices is deter-
mined as   pij =  p i  t ij . Similarly, marginal delivery costs relate to marginal produc-
tion costs by   zij =  z i  t ij , and shipments at the firm level may be defined as  x ij ≡  c ij  t ij =  p i −σ  t ij 1−σ P j σ−1 yj.
Accordingly, we may rewrite equation (10) as
(11)  π ij = (  p i −  z i ) x ij −  f ij .
Notice that fixed entry costs  f ij are specific to an import market. Consequently, 
i-borne firms will decide to supply goods to consumers in j only if operating profits 
(  p i −  z i ) x ij cover the market-specific fixed costs  f ij . With monopolistic competition, 
a constant elasticity of substitution σ between products, and a fixed markup over 
marginal production costs, operating profits per unit of output are (  p i −  z i ) =  p i /σ 
and i-borne firms will supply market j only if  p i  x ij ≥ σ  f ij . Let us define an indicator 
function    ij which is unity, if  p i  x ij ≥ σ fij, and zero else. After defining the number of 
producers in country i as  n i , we may write aggregate nominal goods exports from i 
to j in equilibrium as
(12)  n i  p i  x ij ≡  X ij =   ij  n i  p i 1−σ  t ij 1−σ  P j σ−1 yj.
As in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), a country’s world (including intrana-
tional) sales add up to GDP and we may state:
(13)  y i = ( n i  p i 1−σ ) ∑ 
j=1
n
   (  ij  t ij 1−σ  P j σ−1 yj).
18 We will estimate some models below that accommodate the case of heterogeneous firms. This can be done by 
introducing a polynomial control function which is based on the linear predictions in the extensive margin model, 
similar to Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). See below for further details.
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Now, after defining  y W =  ∑ i=1 n   y i , we may substitute ( n i  p i 1−σ ) by  y i / y W  Π i 1−σ in (12) 
to obtain an equivalent expression for nominal aggregate bilateral exports to the 
one in equation (1). Yet, unlike in (1), zero bilateral exports may surface in the non-
stochastic part of the model:
(14)  X ij =   ij  yi yj _ y W    t ij 1−σ  Π i σ−1  P j σ−1 .
Analogous to the discussion in Section I, the unobserved  Π i 1−σ and  P j 1−σ can be 
computed as implicit solutions to the system of 2n equations
(15)  Π i 1−σ =  ∑ 
j=1
n
  (  ij  t ij 1−σ  P j σ−1 yj/ y W );   P j 1−σ =  ∑ 
i=1
 
n
  (  ij  t ij 1−σ  Π i σ−1  y i / y W ),
where  Π i 1−σ and  P j 1−σ are the equivalent expressions to the ones in equation (2), but 
allowing for zero trade flows.
B. An Empirical Two-Part model of Trade
We consider now estimation of a stochastic version of the gravity model with zero 
trade flows as in (14):
(16)  X ij =   ij exp( Z ij ′ β + δPT A ij +  α i + γj) ϵ ij .
Taking expectations and using the law of iterated expectations we can write the CEF 
as
(17) E( X ij | ⋅) =       Pr  (  ij = 1 | ⋅)E(exp( Z ij ′ β + δPT A ij +  α i + γj) ϵ ij | ⋅,   ij = 1)
 =       Pr  (  ij = 1 | ⋅)E( X ij | ⋅,   ij = 1).
This is a two-part model which allows to decompose the effects of the explanatory 
variables on exports into an effect on the extensive country margin—i.e., the deci-
sion to export to a country at all—and on the intensive margin—i.e., on the value 
of exports conditional on positive exports. In the baseline model (8), the estimated 
effect represents some average of these two. Two-part econometric models have 
been discussed in econometrics for some time (John G. Cragg 1971; Naihua Duan 
et al. 1984), but have not been implemented in the empirical trade literature so far, 
to the best of our knowledge.
To complete the specification of the two-part model and make it operational, 
functional forms for the probability of trading and the expected trading volume have 
to be defined. Retaining endogeneity of PTA in exports, we postulate for the second 
part of (17) a similar relationship as the one used before,
(18) E( X ij |  Z ij ,  W ij , PT A ij ,   ij = 1) =  λ ij  Ψ ij ,
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where  λ ij and  Ψ ij are analogous to the expressions in (9). However, note that as this 
functional form is now assumed to hold for positive exporters only, and not for all 
observations as in (8)–(9), the parameters β, δ and ϑ in (18) do not denote the same 
quantities as in the model of Section IV.
Let us now turn to the first part of the model, the probability of country i to serve 
country j via exports at all. For this purpose, the model for   ij as defined by equation (11) is translated into a stochastic process
(19)   ij = {  1 if   Q ij ′  ω + κpt a ij ≥  ξ ij ,   0 else, 
where the vector  Q ij is a set of observable variables determining positive exports (i.e., 
positive profits for firms in i which are specific to market j), ω are the corresponding 
unknown parameters, κ is the parameter of the PTA indicator variable, and ξij is 
a stochastic term. Note that  Q ij may but need not contain the same elements as 
Z ij . Since PTA membership is an endogenous determinant of the positive value of 
exports, it would be awkward to assume that it is exogenous to the decision to export 
at all from i to j. Therefore, we explicitly allow for dependence between ξij and 
pt a ij . With a binary dependent variable (  ij ) and a binary endogenous regressor (pt a ij ) at hand, we follow a large literature in modeling the two binary processes by 
means of a bivariate probit model (cf. Chiara Monfardini and Rosalba Radice 2008, 
for some recent applications). Then, the probability of trading conditional on PTA 
membership can be written as (see, e.g., William H. Greene 2008)
(20)       Pr  (  ij = 1 |  Q ij ,  W ij , pt a ij ) = 
    Φ 2 [(2pt a ij − 1) W ij ′ θ,  Q ij ′ ω + κpt a ij ,(2pt a ij − 1) ρ vξ ]     ____   Φ[(2pt a ij − 1) W ij ′ θ] ,
where  Φ 2 denotes the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function and  ρ vξ the 
correlation between v and ξ.
Thus, the impact of a variable on the CEF (17) is modeled in a very flexible man-
ner in the two-part model, allowing a variable to have different effects in each part 
of the two components of (17). For instance, it is possible for a variable to have a 
strong impact on the extensive country margin—the probability of initiating exports 
to a given country which is determined mainly by ω and κ at given  Q ij and pt a ij 
—but to have a small impact on the intensive margin—an increase of the value of 
positive bilateral exports resulting principally from β at given regressors.
A convenience of such a model is that the two parts, (18) and (20), can be esti-
mated separately. Thus, consistent estimates of the parameters of (20), ω, κ, θ as 
well as the degree of endogeneity of PTA (as measured by the correlation between 
PTA and  ξ ij ) can be obtained by standard maximum likelihood estimation. As 
 for the parameters from (18), we can use the same two-stage PML procedures 
described in Section IV, and include only the observations with positive exports in 
the estimation.
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C. A Two-Part model with correlated Errors and firm Heterogeneity
The two-part model presented in the previous sub-section differs from alternative 
approaches suggested in the recent literature to discriminate between effects at the 
extensive and intensive country margins of trade. The dominant procedure in the 
current literature is to estimate some form of sample selection model (see Helpman, 
Melitz, and Rubinstein 2008; and Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2008), most often a 
log-linear Heckit model.
While it is generally acknowledged that the statistical properties and robustness 
of sample selection models are often inferior to the ones of the two-part model 
(Duan, et al. 1984; Manning, Duan, and William H. Rogers 1987; Siu Fai Leung 
and Shihti Yu 1996; William H. Dow and Edward C. Norton 2003), proponents of 
sample selection models have advocated the use of the former over the latter based 
on its explicit modeling of the correlation structure between the errors in the two 
equations.19 The two-part model does not estimate any covariance terms between 
two error vectors. However, it is consistent under some general classes of joint dis-
tributions which allow for stochastic dependence between error terms. In particular, 
the two-part model allows for joint distributions of the errors which are excluded 
by assumption under sample selection models (see Duan, et al. 1984). If the error 
terms are independent across the participation and outcome equations, the two-part 
model is efficient relative to the sample selection model. If the errors are not inde-
pendent, it is difficult to decide between two-part versus selection models as they 
are not nested.
We decided to address correlated disturbances between the intensive and exten-
sive margin by estimating an additional two-part model with a semiparametric con-
trol-function. We follow Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) to postulate that 
the disturbances of the two models are independent conditional on some nonlinear 
function of the predictions of the extensive margin equation. In the Heckit approach 
taken by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), the linear prediction of the exten-
sive margin model enters in a nonlinear form by inclusion of the inverse Mills’ ratio, 
i.e., the ratio of the probability density function and the cumulative normal distri-
bution function evaluated at the linear prediction of the participation equation. We 
denote this linear prediction by
   ηij ≡  Q ij ′   ω +   κPT A ij .
In our application, the inverse Mills’ ratio would not contribute significantly to the 
explanatory power since it is almost linear over a large part of the relevant range of 
its argument.20
19 The participation equation which, in our case, corresponds to the extensive country margin model of trade, 
and the outcome equation which corresponds to the intensive country margin model.
20 This is true for the models we report below as well as ones that use religion as in Helpman, Melitz, and 
Rubinstein (2008) as an identifying instrument in the participation equation for the extensive country margin of 
exports. The coefficient estimates are very robust to the inclusion of religion as an identifying instrument for the 
extensive country margin of exports. However, we report results which exclude this variable for the sake of keeping 
an additional 506 observations in the sample for which the religion variable is not available.
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Thus, we model the correlation among disturbances conditional on a nonlinear 
function of   ηij by including polynomial terms up to a fourth order (excluding the 
linear term for reasons of collinearity). Not only is this approach more flexible than 
the inclusion of the Mills’ ratio alone, but it also has the added advantage that the 
polynomial control function captures possible nonlinearities due to the firm exten-
sive margin. Such additional nonlinearities are present if firms are in fact heterog-
enous. Notice that either problem is addressed by a (slightly different) nonlinear 
function about   ηij also in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). We argue that 
the fourth-order polynomial in   ηij is a flexible approximation of both nonlinear 
functions. While within this semiparametric approach it is impossible to distinguish 
between error correlation and firm heterogeneity, this is irrelevant for our purpose 
of analyzing country margins of trade.21 The (combined) presence of error correla-
tion and firm heterogeneity can be tested for by an f-test of joint significance on the 
coefficients of the approximating polynomial function.
D. Estimation results
Here we discuss the parameter estimates from the models described in Section 
VB and Section VC. Similar to Table 2, Table 3 summarizes the estimates of two 
alternative models of nominal bilateral exports in US dollars ( X ij ). Again, every col-
umn gives parameters and standard errors of covariates of interest in the pertinent 
equations. Yet, now we distinguish between the process generating zero versus posi-
tive exports on the one hand, and the process generating alternative positive values 
of exports on the other. The former is captured by a probit model for   ij as explained 
in Section VB, while the latter is estimated via Poisson PML.
Columns 2 to 4 give parameters and standard errors when treating PT A ij as 
exogenous. Both column 3 and 4 represent trade volume equations. The differ-
ence between those two is that the model in column 4 controls for higher-order 
polynomial terms in   ηij while the one in (3) does not. Hence, the specification in (4) implicitly accommodates correlation between the disturbances of the extensive 
country margin equation in column 2 and the intensive country margin model in 
column 3 as well as heterogeneous firms akin to the approach of Helpman, Melitz, 
and Rubinstein (2008). In columns 6 to 8, we treat PT A ij as endogenous. To model 
this, in addition to the two equations for   ij and exports, a third equation for PTA 
is needed. Endogeneity of PT A ij in   ij is captured by a recursive bivariate probit 
model as summarized in columns 5 and 6. While we use the same specification for 
the latent process behind the extensive country margin   ij (i.e., the process ηij) as 
for positive exports (or E( X ij |  X ij > 0)), the results are virtually identical to a model 
where we use religion as an additional regressor in the extensive margin model 
as in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). Similar to columns 3 and 4 with 
exogenous PTAs, we estimate models (7) and (8) with endogenous PTAs where the 
difference lies in the polynomial function about   ηij which is present in column 8 but 
not in 7. The coefficients of the polynomial function are jointly significant (in both 
21 This is in contrast to work analyzing firm margins of trade, for which the distinction between firm extensive 
margin and error correlation is crucial (Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein 2008).
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Table 3—Estimation Results for Two-Part Gravity Models for Trade
Exogenous PTA Endogenous PTA
Regression Pr(X > 0) E(X | X > 0) E(X | X > 0) Pr(PTA = 1)  Pr(X > 0) E(X | X > 0)  E(X | X > 0)
Estimator Probit Poisson Poisson Biv.Probit Biv.Probit Poisson Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PTA 0.3515 0.3698 0.3642 — −0.0307 1.2118 1.2701
(0.0559) (0.0711) (0.0706) (0.1326) (0.3715) (0.3961)
diST −1.1454 −0.6209 −0.6049 −1.0689 −0.9448 −0.3873 −0.4958
(0.0466) (0.0344) (0.0395) (0.0388) (0.0434) (0.0670) (0.1135)
Bord −0.4276 0.6478 0.6948 −0.4469 −0.0647 0.7566 0.8124
(0.1848) (0.0596) (0.0603) (0.1184) (0.1673) (0.0759) (0.0812)
LAng 0.6341 0.2108 0.1907 −0.0974 0.6258 0.2241 0.2368
(0.0628) (0.0627) (0.0613) (0.0616) (0.0616) 0.0655) 0.0922)
conT 0.1041 0.2897 0.2926 0.7794 0.3095 0.0930 −0.0797
(0.0596) (0.0656) (0.0642) (0.0479) (0.0581) (0.1568) (0.1531)
durAB −0.0070 −0.0028 −0.0026 −0.0071 −0.0018 −0.0043 −0.0040
(0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0009)
PoLcomP −0.0027 0.0804 0.0918 −0.0483 0.0042 0.0947 0.0920
(0.0087) (0.0198) (0.0201) (0.0089) (0.0086) (0.0262) (0.0269)
AuToc 0.0011 −0.0594 −0.0681 0.0479 −0.0069 −0.1296 −0.1283
(0.0093) (0.0301) (0.0298) (0.0097) (0.0092) (0.0305) (0.0317)
curcoL −0.1339 0.3802 0.3685 0.5218 −0.1638 0.5391 0.4842
(0.3752) (0.1872) (0.1807) (0.2377) (0.3396) (0.1784) (0.1788)
( ˆ  ηij ) 2 — — −0.0377 — — — −0.1129(0.0044) (0.0483)
( ˆ  ηij ) 3 — — 0.0094 — — — 0.0359(0.0012) (0.0365)
( ˆ  ηij ) 4 — — −0.0006 — — — −0.0053(0.0001) (0.0063)
coLony — — — 0.1318 — — —
(0.1899)
comcoL — — — 0.4505 — — —
(0.0757)
SmcTry — — — 1.2244 — — —
(0.2210)
 ˆ  ρvξ — — — — 0.2895 — —(0.0834)
 ˆ   ϑ — — — — — −0.4016 −0.4373(0.1710) (0.1770)
f-stat. — — 48.4092 3.7782 1.6329 5.5857
p-value of f — — 0.0000 0.2864 0.6519 0.1336
f-stat. OIR — — — 2.6605 1.4530 3.0029
p-value of OIR — — — 0.1029 0.4836 0.2228
Number 13,500 9,891 9,891 15,750 15,750 9,891 9,891
Countries 126 126 126 126 126 126 126
notes: All regressions include importer and exporter fixed effects. In the second column, the number of observations is reduced 
due to countries that export to the whole “world” and which are dropped from the estimation. These are Belgium, Canada, 
Switzerland, China, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, GB, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
USA. The sources of the data are the United Nations’ World Trade Database and the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales. “f-stat.” and “p-value of f” refer to a test of joint significance of coLony, comcoL and SmcTry in the respec-
tive equation. The f-statistic should be significantly different from zero in column 5 but not in 6–8. “f-stat. OIR” and “p-value of 
OIR” refer to a test for overidentifying restrictions in the corresponding log-linear IV model.
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the exogenous case in column 4 as well as in column 8 where PTA is endogenous) 
suggesting some role for firm heterogeneity and/or error correlation between the 
decision to trade and trade flows.22
Consider the model imposing exogeneity first. Every variable has two associated 
parameters, one corresponding to the extensive margin in column 2 and one for the 
intensive margin of trade in column 3 or column 4. Almost all coefficients have 
the same sign in the extensive versus the intensive margin models. Exceptions are 
Bord, curcoL, and PoLcomP—the latter being insignificant in column 2—, 
which appear to be impediments to start trading but foster trade flows once exports 
are positive. The result about Bord and curcoL is in line with previous research 
(see Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein 2008).
To give an impression of the implied effect on trade flows, Table 4 shows the 
total partial effect of PTA on trade. By partial effect we mean here the effect that 
PTA has on exports keeping everything else constant, including the general equi-
librium effects which work through the change in the multilateral resistance terms: 
E(X | PTA = 1, Z)/E(X | PTA = 0, Z) − 1. A quantification by means of counterfac-
tual analysis, taking into account third-country effects present in the MR terms in 
(15) and GDP through equation (13) is reported in Section VI.
With an estimated coefficient of   δ = 0.55, the partial effect in the single 
index model from Table 2 is 74 percent (= exp(  δ) − 1), which is reasonably 
22 We also compared the models based on goodness-of-fit (not reported). The estimated mean square error 
(MSE) of the two-part model with   η-terms is about 15 percent lower than the other two-part model’s. In turn, this 
two-part model has a MSE which is substantially lower than that of a conventional log-linear Heckit or parametric 
Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) estimator.
Table 4—Partial (i.e., Non-General-Equilibrium) Effects of PTA
Decomposition
Model Total Ext. marg. Int. marg.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exogenous PTA
Single index 74.15 — —
 Table 2, column 3
Two-part 67.92 19.59 48.33
 Table 3, columns 2, 3
Two-part with  ˆ   ηij  -terms 66.98 19.52 47.45
 Table 3, columns 2, 4
Endogenous PTA
Single index 214.90 — —
 Table 2, columns 4, 5
Two-part 235.02 −0.60 235.62
 Table 3, columns 5–7
Two-part with  ˆ   ηij  -terms 255.12 −0.63 255.75
 Table 3, columns 5, 6, 8
notes: Ext. marg. and int. marg. are the partial effects of PTA membership on the extensive and 
intensive margins of exports, respectively. Partial effects for two-part models are evaluated at the 
average of explanatory variables.
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close to the total partial effect at the average in the two-part model, 68 percent 
(= [Φ( Q ij ′   ω +   κ)/Φ( Q ij ′   ω)]exp(  δ) − 1, where sample averages are used for the 
variables in  Q ij ), so that we may say that they indeed measure the same quantity. 
The two-part model allows us to decompose this total effect into the contributions 
from the extensive and intensive margin:
      
E(X | PTA = 1, Z) − E(X | PTA = 0, Z) ___
E(X | PTA = 0, Z)  
      =  Φ(Q′ω + κ) − Φ(Q′ω)   __Φ(Q′ω)   
(exp(δ) + 1)  __
2
  
      + [exp(δ) − 1]  Φ(Q′ω + κ) + Φ(Q′ω)   __Φ(Q′ω)  ,
where the first term is the partial effect at the extensive margin and the second 
term the one at the intensive margin. Evaluated at the average of the explanatory 
variables, these are estimated to be 20 percentage points and 48 percentage points, 
respectively, in our sample (i.e., around 70 percent of the partial effect is found to be 
attributable to the intensive country margin).
Let us contrast this finding with the results obtained when letting PTA be poten-
tially endogenous. We use the same variables here as before—coLony, comcoL, 
and SmcTry—as identifying instruments for PTA in the two equations for   ij (col-
umn 6 in Table 3) and positive exports (columns 7 and 8). As the distributional 
assumption identifies the bivariate probit model, we can test the three overidentify-
ing restrictions (OIR) with an f-test. The null hypothesis that the restrictions hold 
cannot be rejected in neither part of the model (row “p-value of f ” in columns 6, 7 
and 8). The instruments also pass the OIR test in log-linearized instrumental vari-
able models (row “p-value of OIR” in columns 6, 7, and 8)23.
Let us now discuss the results about the error correlations and the coefficient of 
PTA. The estimate of ϑ is negative and significant, which is in line with our find-
ings in Table 2. Hence, as before, selection into PTAs on unobservables is negative. 
A significant   ρvξ likewise suggests that there is endogeneity in the selection into 
exports decision. Here, we find evidence of positive self-selection based on unob-
servables, which is reflected in the overestimation of the impact of PTA on the deci-
sion to export at all when neglecting endogeneity of PTA. As a matter of fact, the 
results in Table 3 suggest that after controlling for endogeneity, PTA membership 
has an impact on the intensive margin, but does not significantly affect the extensive 
margin of trade, i.e., the country intensive margin accounts for the whole partial 
effect of PTA (see also the corresponding estimated partial effects in Table 4).
Such a result could, for instance, be explained by sufficiently high market-specific 
fixed entry costs which are unaffected by PTA formation, whereas marginal delivery 
costs are lowered by PTA membership. Note that these results are compatible with 
23 The test has two degrees of freedom here as one instrument is needed for identification.
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empirical research at a disaggregate level which emphasizes PTA to be important 
in shaping some extensive margins of trade. Timothy J. Kehoe and Kim J. Ruhl 
(2009), for instance, found NAFTA to affect the extensive margin at the level (i.e., 
the number) of products traded. Extensive and intensive product margins are partly 
subsumed by, but not identical to, the country intensive margin.24 Finally, the fact 
that the estimated correlations are of different signs is perfectly compatible with the 
general specification of the model. The differently signed correlations suggest that, 
after controlling for economic and political determinants, extensive and intensive 
margins of export appear to be driven by heterogeneous factors.
The remaining variables are only marginally affected by the change from the 
model for exogenous PTA to the one where it is endogenous, with the sole excep-
tion here being again Bord, which looses its significant negative impact on the 
extensive margin.
VI. Quantification and Discussion
We will illustrate the importance of considering both self-selection into PTAs and 
zero export flows by means of counterfactual analysis. In particular, we will com-
pute the impact of PTA membership as observed in the year 2005 to a situation with-
out any PTA membership in the same year, using a variety of different estimators 
and taking into account general equilibrium effects addressed in Sections I and VA.
The literature on the impact of endogenous PTA formation on trade suggests a 
positive parameter estimate on nominal bilateral exports. For instance, Baier and 
Bergstrand (2009) report estimates of average treatment effects of in between 0.68 
(using the matching estimator of Alberto Abadie and Guido W. Imbens (2006), for 
the year 2000; implying an effect of about 97 percent) and 2.36 (using the same 
approach for the year 1990). While these estimates lie in a similar range as the 
ones reported in previous work and take non-linear effects of trade costs as possible 
determinants of PTA formation into account, they do not consider non-linear gen-
eral equilibrium effects of PTAs on exports. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) acknowl-
edge general equilibrium effects with panel data but assume that PTA membership 
is exogenous. However, the average treatment effects from their preferred models 
are still very close to the cross-sectional endogenous treatment effects in their more 
recent paper, amounting to 0.62 (implying an effect of about 86 percent) and 0.54 
(implying an effect of about 72 percent). Relative to Baier and Bergstrand’s (2009), 
Magee’s (2003) estimated PTA-effects on trade seem rather large: they lie between 
300 percent and 800 percent. However, these estimates do not account for fixed 
country effects in both trade volume and PTA equation.
Unlike previous work, our quantification of PTA effects on trade flows respects 
general equilibrium effects, accounts for the differential impact of PTAs on the 
extensive and intensive margins of exports, and treats PTAs endogenously. Finally, 
24 A change at the extensive product margin as in Feenstra and Hiau Looi Kee (2008) or Kehoe and Ruhl (2009) 
would be equivalent to a change at the extensive country margin only for the first product(s) traded bilaterally. 
Otherwise, an expansion at the extensive product margin for any pair of countries is measured by an increase in the 
intensive country margin of exports in an aggregate analysis as ours.
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we will also infer the importance of something that did not surface in the debate 
about PTA effects on trade yet: that most-favored nation tariffs are heterogeneous so 
that PTA membership does not bring about identical tariff reductions across coun-
try-pairs (see Anderson and van Wincoop 2002, for a treatment of tariff effects in 
their general equilibrium model).
Starting point of the quantification are the parameter estimates summarized in 
Tables 2 and 3. Note that so far we did not need to rely on any specific underlying 
model. Our estimation equations leading to the econometric specification for the 
parameter estimation are perfectly consistent with a wide range of recent interna-
tional trade models.25 Specifically, it captures new trade theory models with love-
of-variety preferences and homogeneous firms à la Krugman (1980), the Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2003) exchange economy, the Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein 
(2008) model allowing for firm heterogeneity and zero trade flows, the Eaton and 
Kortum (2002) Ricardian model, and the Melitz and Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano 
(2008) model with quasi-linear quadratic preferences and endogenous mark-ups. 
However, if one wants to go further and run a counterfactual analysis, it is necessary 
to adopt one specific model and use the implied structural model equations. In the 
subsequent analysis, we apply the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) framework. 
Hence, in addition to the parameter estimates, we use the assumption that countries 
are endowment economies and exports are related to exporter and importer GDP as 
well as multilateral resistance terms as in equation (1).
For a quantification of the general equilibrium-consistent average treatment 
effect of observed PTA membership on exports, we need to determine counterfac-
tual bilateral exports in the absence of PTA membership. For this, we set the binary 
PTA indicator to zero and solve the system of 2n equations of exporter and importer 
MR terms in (15).26 This can be done by assuming that PTA membership is associ-
ated with heterogeneous tariff reductions or not.27 Irrespective of whether hetero-
geneous tariffs are acknowledged or not, PTA formation has an impact on GDP 
and the latter has to be considered in the solution of (15) and in the outcome equa-
tion for the intensive margin of exports, i.e., in (14). Tables 5 and 6 summarize the 
predicted effects of PTA formation on trade among PTA members relative to non-
members for the models estimated in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.28 For each model, 
25 This is due to the fact that the differences between models pertain to country-specific variables, which are 
captured by country-fixed effects in our estimation equations.
26 Since σ, the elasticity of substitution between products, is not known, its level has to be estimated or to be 
assumed. In the model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), it can not be estimated since the model does not 
impose enough structure. So, we follow them in setting σ = 5. Note that they find trade predictions to be fairly 
insensitive to the choice of different values of σ. (If one used a model which specified the supply side explicitly—
such as a multi-country version of Krugman’s (1980) model—one would be able to estimate σ.)
27 To account for heterogeneous tariffs, we use data on tariff revenues in total trade flows from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators 2007, assume that tariff rates are identical vis-à-vis all PTA nonmembers, and apply 
these tariffs to trade flows of all trading partners of a country in the counterfactual abolishment of preferential trade 
liberalization. In principal, one could replace PT A ij by an appropriately defined (endogenous) tariff variable and 
apply the framework suggested here. However, tariffs may be inaccurately measured and PTA membership may 
entail more than just a bilateral reduction in tariffs. Therefore, we prefer approximating tariff effects as indicated 
but employ the binary indicator variable in the regressions.
28 According to Walras’ law, absolute trade effects are impossible to gauge in general but they have to be 
expressed relative to one country-pair or relative to a group of pairs.
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we  distinguish between effects that assume that PTAs alter homogeneous tariffs (in 
Table 5) preferentially versus ones that alter heterogeneous tariffs (in Table 6).
In a nutshell, the figures in the tables suggest the following conclusions. First, trade 
among PTA members increases due to preferential tariff abolition. For instance, the 
model which assumes exogenous PTA formation, no specific process for the exten-
sive margin to export, and no heterogeneous tariff effect on trade and GDP points 
to an increase in nominal exports among PTA members relative to nonmembers by 
about 59 percent relative to an equilibrium without any PTAs. This is reflected in 
the number which is given in the outer left column of the top row of Table 5 labeled 
“Average percentage increase of trade flows of members relative to non-members.” 
The estimated effect is about 102 percentage points higher with endogenous PTA 
formation (about 161 percent higher exports among PTA members relative to non-
members than without PTAs; see the results in the column labeled (3)–(4) at the top 
of Table 5). Ignoring the heterogeneity of tariffs brings about a negligible bias in 
our application.29 To see the latter, compare the results at the top of Table 5 with the 
corresponding ones in Table 6.
29 In all models, the predicted effect of PTA membership on members’ versus nonmembers’ bilateral trade 
is slightly lower when considering heterogeneity of most-favored nation tariffs. The relatively small bias from 
Table 5—Counterfactual Results with Homogeneous Tariff Rates
One-part models (Table 2) Two-part modelsb (Table 3)
Exog. PTA Endog. PTA Exog. PTA Endog. PTA
Based on columns in respective table (3) (4)–(5) (2)–(3) (2), (4) (5)–(7) (5), (6), (8)
Average percentage increase of
 trade flows of PTA members
 relative to non-members
58.97 161.36 41.80 45.75 219.36 234.57
Δ X ij among PTA members in 
percent:a
 mean 39.3965 101.6426 14.2631 12.6884 59.4102 61.8560
 std. dev. 29.5054 94.7278 15.1128 14.5677 68.1883 73.9056
 min −10.9748 −22.2771 −25.9965 −25.1213 −63.4330 −64.9363
 max 141.6656 514.3927 62.0881 61.9867 381.9351 431.8087
Number of PTA member pairs with
 positive effect 3,456 3,450 2,749 2,719 2,701 2,674
 negative effect 50 56 229 259 277 304
Δ X ij among PTA non-members in 
percent:a 
 mean −4.8554 −9.0345 −6.6081 −6.7792 −18.8946 −19.5906
 std. dev. 16.1757 32.7673 8.8012 9.0138 22.7672 23.7805
 min −41.8862 −67.5594 −45.9182 −45.3577 −87.3477 −88.5390
 max 38.6748 95.6077 10.4128 13.0945 27.7728 32.5374
Number of PTA non-member pairs 
with
 positive effect 4,108 3,916 691 683 473 498
 negative effect 8,136 8,328 6,222 6,230 6,440 6,415
notes: There are 3,632 PTA member pairs, whereof in 654 Δ X ij = 0 occurred. Of the 12,244 PTA non-member 
pairs, in 5,331 cases the model predicted Δ X ij = 0.
 a  Δ X ij  : base scenario trade flows minus counterfactual trade flows relative to counterfactual trade flows in per-
cent; std. dev.: standard deviation.
 b  In the two-part models, Δ X ij was calculated in the sub-sample of pairs with positive trade flows  X ij in both the 
benchmark and the counterfactual equilibrium. 
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Modeling the process of endogenous selection into positive exports separate from 
the non-linear process of positive exports is relatively important. It raises the pre-
dicted effect of PTA formation with endogenous PTAs on insiders’ trade relative to 
other country-pairs. In the column labeled (5)–(7) of Table 5, the estimated com-
parative static effect of PTA membership amounts to 219 percent, which exceeds 
the one-part model-based result of 161 percent by about 58 percentage points. In 
the two-part model, which allows for correlated disturbances between the extensive 
and intensive country margin equations at the outer right of Table 5, the correspond-
ing estimated comparative static effect is about 235 percent. Of the latter effect 
on exports, the lion’s share is contributed by the intensive margin.30 Overall, the 
estimated (long-run) effects of PTA membership on bilateral trade are quite large.
 ignoring tariff heterogeneity has to do with the fact that, on average, most-favored nation tariffs are relatively 
homogeneous across countries in 2005 so that capturing tariff effects by a binary PTA indicator variable does not 
conceal much information.
30 Of 9,891 country-pairs with predicted positive bilateral exports in the cum-PTA benchmark equilibrium, 
69 are predicted to stop exporting if all PTAs were abandoned when using the exogenous-PTA probit model in 
column 2 of Table 3. With the endogenous-PTA model in column 6 of Table 3, 106 are predicted to stop export-
ing in counterfactual general equilibrium relative to the benchmark equilibrium. This result is based on estimates 
which disregard the fact that (most-favored nation) tariffs are heterogeneous across countries so that preferential 
Table 6—Counterfactual Results with Heterogeneous Tariff Rates
One-part models (Table 2) Two-part modelsb (Table 3)
Exog. PTA Endog. PTA Exog. PTA Endog. PTA
Based on columns in respective table (3) (4)–(5) (2)–(3) (2), (4) (5)–(7) (5), (6), (8)
Average percentage increase of
 trade flows of PTA members
 relative to non-members
58.61 160.88 41.68 45.69 219.13 234.48
Δ X ij among PTA members in 
percent:a
 mean 40.7396 103.1379 13.7920 12.5047 58.7820 61.3718
 std. dev. 30.5686 96.0032 15.1707 14.8975 67.8647 73.5924
 min −10.0238 −21.7366 −27.4492 −26.8490 −64.0591 −65.5265
 max 142.8524 516.1415 61.1247 62.5190 376.4445 425.3974
Number of PTA member pairs with
 positive effect 3,458 3,448 2,736 2,695 2,700 2,674
 negative effect 48 58 242 283 278 304
Δ X ij among PTA non-members in 
percent:a 
 mean −3.7172 −8.2642 −6.8230 −6.7841 −19.0597 −19.7246
 std. dev. 16.5521 33.0922 8.9757 9.1057 22.8397 23.8268
 min −42.0441 −67.6475 −46.4574 −45.8900 −87.4854 −88.6601
 max 39.7881 96.4289 10.1447 12.6403 26.9016 32.1130
Number of PTA non-member pairs 
with
 positive effect 4,484 4,008 658 723 458 483
 negative effect 7,760 8,236 6,255 6,190 6,455 6,430
notes: There are 3,632 PTA member pairs, whereof in 654 Δ X ij = 0 occurred. Of the 12,244 PTA non-member 
pairs, in 5,331 cases the model predicted Δ X ij = 0.
 a  Δ X ij  : base scenario trade flows minus counterfactual trade flows relative to counterfactual trade flows in per-
cent; std. dev.: standard deviation.
 b  In the two-part models, Δ X ij was calculated in the sub-sample of pairs with positive trade flows  X ij in both the 
benchmark and the counterfactual equilibrium. 
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Moreover, Tables 5 and 6 indicate that a focus on PTA effects on average trade 
flows—as had been done in most of the previous work on endogenous PTA effects on 
trade flows—conceals the sizable variation effects across country pairs.31 To see this, 
consider the two blocs of results in the lower parts of Tables 5 and 6. There, we report 
four moments of the distribution of the percentage changes of bilateral exports both of 
PTA members (at the center of each table) as well as of non-members (at the very bot-
tom of each table): the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum, and the maximum 
effect for each model.32 Obviously, most of the models display a standard deviation 
of effects within the groups of PTA members and non-members, which exceeds the 
average effect. The variation in the effects is entirely due to the relevance of heteroge-
neity across countries in general  equilibrium. Hence, the underlying theoretical model 
suggests that the treatment effect of PTA membership is inherently heterogeneous. 
The results even point to negative effects from the simultaneous implementation of 
PTAs in the world economy on some PTA members (accruing to third country effects 
of foreign PTAs). Similarly, there are even PTA non-members which gain from the 
simultaneous implementation of foreign PTAs. PTA members face positive and PTA 
non-members negative effects of PTA formation on trade flows only on average.
Altogether, these findings suggest that the empirical models proposed here may 
help to estimate effects of endogenous PTA effects on trade flows which have appeal 
from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. First, proposed models princi-
pally allow for a disproportionate number of zero trade flows and endogenous PTA 
membership which previously proposed estimators for gravity models did not allow 
for (and accommodated only one or the other). Second, the proposed models allow 
for estimation of effects which fully account for general equilibrium effects of PTA 
membership associated with GDP responses to membership and ultimately hetero-
geneous treatment effects of PTA formation. For instance, recently proposed micro-
econometric methods (such as propensity score matching or switching regression) 
did not share this feature.
VII. Concluding Remarks
This paper proposes non-linear econometric techniques for the analysis of trade 
policy effects on bilateral trade flows which subsume three features: they pay spe-
cific attention to zeros in bilateral trade matrices; they allow trade policy variables—
such as binary preferential trade agreement (PTA) indicators but eventually also 
trade liberalization is associated with tariff reductions of different magnitude across country-pairs. In order to dis-
entangle PTA-induced effects on exports that arise through changes at the extensive and intensive margins of trade 
we proceeded as follows. First, we calculated the total effect on trade by using estimates of the two-part model with 
endogenous PTAs—including effects on the extensive and intensive margins. Then, we calculated an alternative 
counterfactual by holding the margin constant at the benchmark equilibrium. The latter, leads to results that are very 
similar to the ones for the one-part models, where endogenous selection into positive exports is not accounted for.
31 That treatment effects tend to be heterogeneous across the treated is widely acknowledged in other fields of 
economics (see Marianne P. Bitler, Jonah Gelbach, and Hilary W. Hoynes 2006, for an example in public econom-
ics). However, empirical international economists tend to focus on average effects of treatments such as PTA mem-
bership and other treatments on outcome of interest and tend to ignore that theoretical models often would suggest 
heterogeneous treatment effects.
32 Notice that, for all two-part models, we provide these figures only for the subsample of country-pairs with 
positive exports.
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continuous trade policy measures—to be endogenous; and they account for non-
linear effects of trade policy and trade costs in stylized general equilibrium models. 
All of these features have been judged as being important in recent empirical work 
in international economics, but no attempt has been made to address them in a uni-
fied framework as we do.
Apart from addressing the issue from an econometric perspective and from sum-
marizing methodical frameworks for empirical work on the matter, we apply the 
suggested procedures to estimate general equilibrium-consistent effects of PTA 
membership on bilateral trade flows in a cross-sectional dataset for the year 2005. 
For this, we have to assume a specific general equilibrium structure, and we rely on 
the one proposed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for convenience.
The obtained results suggest that ignoring endogenous selection into PTAs is 
relatively harmful. The impact of endogenous PTAs on members’ relative to non-
members’ trade flows is about 188 percentage points higher than in a model which 
assumes PTA membership to be exogenous. With the dataset at hand, the process of 
zero versus positive exports should be modeled separately from the one of positive 
exports. Ignoring the latter leads to a downward bias of the predicted trade effects of 
PTAs by about 73 percentage points as compared to the preferred model.
Appendix: Country coverage (126 economies)
The following set of countries is covered in our dataset:
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, 
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Islamic Rep. Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Rep. Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua 
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, 
Vanuatu, RB Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
PTA coverage (121 agreements).—Our dataset includes all PTAs notified to the 
World Trade Organization that are active since 2005 or earlier. The data are aug-
mented and corrected by using  information from PTA secretariat web-pages. This 
leads to a coverage of the following PTAs in our dataset:
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Albania and Bulgaria, Albania and FYR Macedonia, Albania and Moldova, 
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Albania and Romania, Armenia and Kazakhstan, Armenia and Moldova, Armenia 
and Russian Federation, Armenia and Turkmenistan, Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), Baltic Free Trade Area (BAFTA), Bangkok Agreement, 
Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia, Bulgaria 
and Israel, Bulgaria and Turkey, Central American Common Market (CACM), 
Andean Subregional Integration Agreement (Cartagena Agreement, CAN), Canada 
and Chile, Canada and Israel, Canada and Costa Rica, Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), Australia New 
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (CER), Chile and Costa Rica, 
Chile and El Salvador, Chile and Mexico, Commonwealth of Independent States 
Free Trade Agreement (CIS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), Croatia and Albania, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia 
and FYR Macedonia, East African Community Treaty (EAC), Eurasian Economic 
Community (EAEC), European Community (EC), EC and Algeria, EC and 
Bulgaria, EC and Chile, EC and Croatia, EC and Egypt, EC and FYR Macedonia, 
EC and Iceland, EC and Israel, EC and Jordan, EC and Lebanon, EC and Mexico, 
EC and Morocco, EC and Norway, Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), 
EC and Romania, EC and South Africa, EC and Switzerland and Liechtenstein, EC 
and Syria, EC and Tunesia, EC and Turkey, Agreement on the European Economic 
Area (EEA), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), EFTA and Bulgaria, EFTA 
and Chile, EFTA and Croatia, EFTA and FYR Macedonia, EFTA and Israel, EFTA 
and Jordan, EFTA and Mexico, EFTA and Morocco, EFTA and Romania, EFTA 
and Singapor, EFTA and Tunisia, EFTA and Turkey, FYR Macedonia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, The Unified Economic Agreement between the Countries of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Georgia and Armenia, Georgia and Kazakhstan, 
Georgia and Russian Federation, Georgia and Turkmenistan, Global System of 
Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP), India and Sri Lanka, Israel 
and Turkey, Japan and Mexico, Japan and Singapor, Kyrgyz Republic and Armenia, 
Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova, Kyrgyz Republic 
and Russian Federation, Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI, 
LAIA), Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), Mexico and Israel, Moldova and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and Bulgaria, Moldova and Croatia, Moldova and 
FYR Macedonia, Melanesian Spearhead Group Free Trade Area Agreement (MSG), 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), New Zealand and Singapore, 
Panama and El Salvador, Papua New Guinea–Australia Trade and Commercial 
Relations Agreement (PATCRA), Protocol relating to Trade Negotiations among 
Developing Countries (PTN), Rep. of Korea and Chile, Romania and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Romania and FYR Macedonia, Romania and Israel, Romania 
and Moldova, Romania and Turkey, Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Preferential Trading 
Arrangement (SAPTA), Singapore and Australia, South Pacific Regional Trade 
and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), Thailand and Australia, 
TRIPARTITE, Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey and Croatia, Turkey and 
FYR Macedonia, United States and Chile, United States and Isreal, United States 
and Jordan, United States and Singapore, Unites States and Australia, Traite Modifié 
de l’Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (WAEMU/UEMOA). 
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